produce the utterance in (3).
(3)
OK. I watch it.
Obviously, since you already believe that I watch the programme, the proposition in (4) cannot be relevant to you. The main relevance of the utterance must lie in the proposition in (5).
(4) The speaker of (3) watches Neighbours.
The speaker of (3) is admitting that she watches Neighbours.
In contrast to non-institutional acts which are communicated, others are noncommunicated. Sperber and Wilson (1986: 245) claim that (1) could be a prediction without the hearer having to recover the information in (6):
(6) The speaker of (1) is predicting that the weather will be warmer tomorrow.
They are not claiming that the proposition in (6) cannot be recovered, merely that the recovery of the proposition in (6) is not essential for an utterance of (1) to be comprehended.
In contrast, the recovery of the proposition in (5) is essential for the comprehension of an utterance of (3).
Similarly, Blakemore (1991: 201) argues that (2) could be interpreted as a warning without the hearer having to recover the proposition in (7):
The speaker of (2) is warning the hearer that the path is slippery here.
Blakemore argues that the main relevance 2 of (2) lies just in the proposition that the path is slippery in the place indicated. This is because the contextual implications that the speaker intended the hearer to recover, for example that the hearer might slip and hurt himself in the place indicated, are derivable from the proposition in (2) without the hearer having to recover the proposition in (7). The speech act of warning is therefore not a communicated act, since it is not essential for the comprehension of the utterance in (2).
This, then, is the distinction made between communicated and non-communicated acts: acts whose identification is essential to the comprehension of the utterances which convey them are communicated acts, those which it is not essential to recover are noncommunicated acts. In the following sections I will discuss acts such as predicting in (1) and warning in (2) and argue, for different reasons in each case, that these are communicated acts.
Speech acts and the strength of assumptions
Against the position outlined above, I will argue that predicting in (1) must be a communicated act given the basic types of contextual effect posited in relevance theory.
According to Sperber and Wilson (1986: 108) a deduction based on the union of new information (for example from a proposition expressed by means of an utterance) and old information may give rise to contextual effects. The new and old information constitute the premises and the contextual effects the conclusion. Contextual effects come in three kinds:
contextual implications, strengthening of existing assumptions, and contradiction of existing assumptions. Strength of assumptions is central to all three types of contextual effect.
Concerning contextual implications, Sperber and Wilson (1986: 112) write:
consider first how contextual implication, our original example of a contextual effect, fares when the strength of assumptions is taken into account. Contextual implication is a sub-type of synthetic implication.
Consider, then, the relation between a synthetic implication and the premises effectively used in deriving it. [...] each premise is an argument for the conclusion, or, as we propose to say, each of the premises effectively used in the derivation of a synthetic implication strengthens the conclusion which they jointly imply. The contribution of each individual premise to the strength of this joint conclusion is a function of its own degree of strength.
The strength of the assumptions functioning as premises in the other two types of contextual effect, strengthening and contradiction of existing assumptions, is also clearly important. The degree to which new information strengthens an existing assumption depends on the strength of the new information, and new information can only cancel an existing assumption if the hearer believes the strength of the new information to be greater than the strength of the existing assumption. In the case of new information conveyed by an utterance, its strength will be a function of the strength of the speaker's commitment to the proposition expressed by her utterance together with the hearer's assessment of the speaker's credibility.
Assessment of the strength of the speaker's commitment to the proposition expressed by her utterance is therefore an essential part of the utterance interpretation process. Knowing whether an utterance of (1) is a prediction, hearsay, a meteorological forecast, or a guess will have a bearing on whether an utterance of (1) succeeds in strengthening or contradicting an existing assumption, or whether it gives rise to a strongly or weakly held contextual implication. The recognition of speech acts such as predicting is therefore a necessary condition for the recovery of contextual effects. Since the utterance interpretation process requires that such speech acts will always be identified, they will constitute an integral part of what a speaker wishes to communicate by her utterance. They are therefore communicated acts.
argues that in general a hearer will derive more contextual effects from (10) than from (9); that is, the main relevance of (8) lies in the embedded proposition in (10).
(8) I predict that Jane will leave the room. (Blakemore 1992: 97) (9) The speaker is predicting that Jane will leave the room.
(10) Jane will leave the room.
Since the main relevance of (8) lies in the embedded proposition, the performative can occupy a parenthetical position, as in (11). In contrast, the main relevance of a performative describing a communicated act lies in the higher-level proposition rather than in the embedded proposition, according to Blakemore, and so such performatives cannot occupy parenthetical positions, as (12) illustrates.
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(11) Jane will, I predict, leave the room. (Blakemore 1992: 98) (12) ! Belle d'Azur will win the race, I bet $100. (Recanati 1987 , cited in Blakemore ibid.)
In summary, "parenthetical verbs should name non-communicated acts rather than communicated acts." (Blakemore 1991: 204) This leads to the question of what the purpose of performative verbs such as predicting or warning is. In answer, Blakemore proposes that performative utterances perform two acts simultaneously. In (8) and (11) the speaker is communicating both that Jane will leave the room and that she is making a prediction. The latter act conveys the information that the hearer has less than conclusive evidence for the proposition communicated by the former act; that is, the performative is only relevant in so far as it helps the hearer to understand the embedded proposition (Blakemore 1991: 207; 210f) . However, as Franken (1997) notes, supposing two acts of communication entails two applications of the principle of relevance.
Two applications of the principle of relevance requires two processes of inferential enrichment and two propositional forms, yet Blakemore (1991: 210) treats the acts as occurring simultaneously. If, as I have argued, the identification of speech acts such as 4 Blakemore considers an apparent counterexample, where a communicated act, promising, is named by a parenthetical verb. She argues that the examples below "have much more the quality of a reassurance than a promise." Whilst (ii) clearly is a case of reassurance, since it describes an event which is beyond the speaker's control, (i) describes an act which is within the speaker's control and can therefore be interpreted as a promise. There is thus very little difference between (i) and the nonparenthetical (iii). predicting and warning constitutes an integral part of the process of comprehending utterances which convey them, then we do not need to treat performatives as special cases in which two acts occur simultaneously.
If we accept that speech acts such as predicting and warning are communicated acts, that is, speech acts whose identification is essential to the interpretation of an utterance
containing them, what is the purpose of performative expressions which make such acts explicit? In the absence of a performative verb, the identification of such acts is an inferential process, and so information such as 'The speaker is predicting X' or 'The speaker is warning that X' is implicit information. It is always possible for a speaker to make implicit information explicit, though it may not always be desirable to do so (see Nicolle, forthcoming). In uttering a performative such as (8) or (11) a speaker is engaging in 'strong communication', that is, she is reducing the hearer's responsibility for the determination of contextual effects by constraining the hearer's interpretation process. There may be various reasons why a speaker should wish to do this; she may believe that the hearer might otherwise misinterpret her utterance, or she may wish to increase the salience of a particular speech act in order to encourage the hearer to compute additional contextual effects that he might otherwise not recover.
Conclusion
In the preceding discussion I argued that speech acts which indicate either the strength with which an assumption is held or socially relevant information must be communicated acts. The arguments presented differed in each case, but were based on the claim that both types of information are inherently relevant and therefore essential to the comprehension of utterances which contain them. This claim follows from more basic relevance theory considerations than the supposed distinction between communicated and non-communicated acts.
Computing the strength of an assumption is an essential element in the derivation of contextual effects (contextual implications, and strengthening or elimination of existing assumptions), which is the goal of utterance interpretation according to relevance theory.
Since determining the strength of an assumption is essential to the comprehension of an utterance, speech acts which indicate the strength with which an assumption is held must be communicated given the definition of a communicated act provided by Sperber and Wilson (1986: 245) . Speech acts which convey socially relevant information are likewise communicated since information pertaining to the maintenance and negotiation of power relations and other aspects of the interlocutors' social environment comes with a guarantee of optimal relevance, that is, adequate contextual effects for minimal processing effort. Such information is relevant because the structure of human society ensures that it generally yields adequate contextual effects and the structure of the human cognitive system ensures that such information is easy to process.
These arguments also simplify the analysis of performative utterances. If we assume that acts such as predicting and warning are always communicated, we do not need to posit the occurrence of two simultaneous acts of communication whenever a performative is uttered. Rather than constituting a special case, such utterances can be treated in the same way as any other declarative utterance.
Since all the supposed non-communicated acts discussed in the relevance theory literature indicate either the strength with which an assumption is held or socially relevant information, it follows that all these speech acts are in fact communicated. Rather than constituting an argument against relevance theory, this conclusion follows from some basic tenets of relevance theory and suggests that the distinction between communicated and noncommunicated acts should be abandoned.
